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Abstract 
Focusing on the role of compatibility between products, we consider the choice of 
internal decision-making structures—i.e., centralization and decentralization—and its 
effect on welfare in a network industry where there are horizontally differentiated 
products associated with network externalities. We demonstrate that if the degree of a 
network externality is sufficiently large, it is socially optimal to choose decentralization. 
Furthermore, in the case of consumer ex post expectations, it is optimal for the firm’s 
owners to choose centralization. However, it is socially preferable given a particular 
condition. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In general, the choice of managerial decision-making structures in corporate 
organizations is a very important issue not only for owners (holding companies) but also 
for researchers in economics as well as in business and management. As described in 
Dargaud and Jacques (2015, p. 155), an optimal organizational design depends on a 
number of factors. For example, Maskin et al. (2000) model an organization as a 
hierarchy of managers. Harris and Raviv (2002) explain organization structures, based 
on the coordination of interactions among activities. Baye et al. (1996), Tan and Yuan 
(2003), and Creane and Davidson (2004) consider organizational structures from the 
point of view of strategic behavior; e.g., divisionalization, franchising, and divestiture 
incentives. 
We follow Dargaud and Jacques (2015) who analyze the centralized organization 
(i.e., unitary form) and the decentralized organization (i.e., multidivisional form) to 
develop a theory of the centralization of firms engaged in multimarket collusive 
agreements. Similarly, Rasch and Wambach (2009) use centralized/decentralized 
structure to consider how the choice of internal decision-making rules affects the 
sustainability of collusive behavior. 
In this paper, we consider the choice of internal decision-making structures and its 
effect on welfare in a network industry, focusing on the role of compatibility between 
products. That is, we show that the optimal choice depends on the properties of network 
products and the timing of consumer expectations about network size. 
We often observe network externalities and compatibilities (interconnectivities) in 
network industries. These include not only telecommunications, internet businesses, 
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application software and hardware, banking and credit card systems, and others 
associated with the progress of information and communication technologies but also 
airlines, railways, electric power, and so on.1 
Recently, we have also seen that a holding company resulting from merger and 
acquisitions (M&A), with multi-divisional local unit firms that provide the products and 
service, arises in network industries.2 In this case, our research question is how the 
holding company formed by M&A decides to delegate decision-making to the local 
firms. The question in the context of our model is how the holding company chooses its 
internal decision-making structures; i.e., centralization or decentralization. We 
demonstrate the conditions under which a profit maximizing holding company chooses 
either centralization or decentralization. Furthermore, we also examine the impact of the 
choice on social welfare. This is related to antitrust and competition policies. 
In the following section, we set up the model and examine the noncooperative 
Cournot duopoly case as a benchmark. In Section 3, we consider the optimal choice of 
internal decision-making structures and then examine its effect on welfare, particularly 
on consumer surplus. Furthermore, in Section 4, changing the assumption regarding 
consumer expectation about network size, we similarly investigate the choice of internal 
decision-making structures and its effect on welfare. In the last section, we present our 
conclusions and remaining problems. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  Grajek (2010) empirically analyzes network externalities in the mobile phone 
industry. 
2 Gandal (2002) discusses merger policy in a network industry. 
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2. The Model 
 
2.1. Demand for horizontally differentiated products with network externality 
We consider a network industry where there are two horizontally differentiated products 
associated with network externalities. Applying the frameworks of Economides (1996) 
and Häckner (2000), we assume the following inverse demand function of product i: 
),( eijii SNqqAp                                    (1) 
where A  is the intrinsic market size of product i, iq  is the output of product i, and 
 1,0  represents the level of product substitutability. Furthermore, )( eiSN  is the 
network externality function, where eiS  represents the expected network size of 
product i. We assume a linear network externality function,   ,eiei nSSN   where 
 1,0n  represents the level of network externality. We also assume that the expected 
network size of product i is given by: 
,ejk
e
i
e
i qqS   ,, MNk                                  (2) 
where  ,1,0k ,, MNk   denotes the level of product i’s compatibility 
(interoperability and interconnectivity) with the other product j in the cases of 
noncooperative Cournot competition as a benchmark (N) and a multiproduct monopoly 
case (M) formed by the centralized decision-making. 
Considering the concept of a fulfilled expectation, we assume that consumers 
develop expectations for network sizes before the firms make their output decisions.3 
Thus, when deciding the output level, the expected network sizes are given for the 
                                                 
3 See Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Economides (1996). 
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firms. 
Furthermore, we assume that production costs are zero, because we observe low and 
even negligible running costs and marginal production costs in internet businesses. We 
also assume that there are no costs of decentralization; e.g., various costs incurred in 
changing product lines and resource reallocation. 
 
2.2. Benchmark: Noncooperative Cournot duopoly 
As a benchmark, we consider that two firms noncooperatively compete on quantities, à 
la Cournot, in the market. Based on equation (1), the profit function of firm i is given 
by: 
  .)( ieijii qSNqqA                                 (3) 
The first-order condition (FOC) of profit-maximization is: 
.0)(2 
 e
ijiii
i
i SNqqAqp
q
                     (4) 
At the point of a fulfilled expectation—i.e., when i
e
i qq   and jej qq  —in view of 
equations (2) and (4), we obtain the following: 
.0)()2(  jNi qnqnA                              (5) 
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium—i.e., Nji qqq  —we derive the following 
fulfilled expectation Cournot equilibrium (N): 
,
)(2 N
N nn
Aq                                     (6) 
where Nn  is the level of network compatibility in the case of noncooperative Cournot 
competition. Because this holds that ,NN qp   based on equation (4), the profit in the 
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case of noncooperative Cournot competition is expressed as   .2NN q  
 
 
3. Internal Decision-Making Structures and Welfare 
 
To consider the optimal choice of internal decision-making structures—i.e., either 
centralized or decentralized—we assume that there is a holding company (owners and 
stockholders) that owns two local unit firms, which respectively provide horizontally 
differentiated products with network compatibilities. We use a two-stage game. That is, 
in the first stage, the holding company decides whether or not to delegate the 
quantity-setting decision to its local unit firms. In the second stage, in the case of 
nondelegation, the centralized firm (i.e., the multiproduct firm) decides the output levels 
of the two products; in the case of delegation—i.e., decentralization—two local unit 
firms noncooperatively decide the output level. We derive a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium by backward induction. 
 
3.1. The centralized decision-making structure: A multiproduct monopoly 
The holding company centralizes quantity-setting. This implies that the holding 
company itself determines the output level of the two products. Thus, we can say that 
the holding company is a multiproduct monopoly. 
The multiproduct monopoly that provides products i and j (hereafter, the monopoly) 
determines the output level to maximize the following total profits: 
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    .)()( jejijieiji
jiM
qSNqqAqSNqqA 



            (7) 
The FOC is given by: 
.0)(22 
 e
ijijii
i
M SNqqAqqp
q
               (8) 
At the point of a fulfilled expectation—i.e., when i
e
i qq   and jej qq  —in view of 
equations (2) and (8), we obtain the following: 
.0)2()2(  jMi qnqnA                             (9) 
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium—i.e., Mji qqq  —we derive the following 
fulfilled expectation equilibrium (M): 
,
)2(2 M
M nn
Aq                                   (10) 
where Mn  is the level of network compatibility in the case of the monopoly. 
Using equation (8), because the monopoly price is expressed as   ,1 MM qp   
the profit of a unit firm is given by    .1 2MM q   Thus, the total profits are 
expressed as:    .122 2MMM q   
Taking equations (6) and (10), we obtain the following relationship: 
  ,)()(   NMNM nqq                          (11) 
where  NMn    implies the net level of network compatibilities. If the net level is 
nonpositive, as is well known, the output level in the case of the monopoly is always 
smaller than that in the case of noncooperative Cournot competition. However, if the net 
level is larger than the level of product substitutability—i.e.,     NMn —the 
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output level in the case of the monopoly is larger than that in the case of noncooperative 
Cournot competition. This implies that the monopoly increases consumer surplus 
compared with the case of noncooperative Cournot competition. 
It is necessary to maintain the condition—i.e.,     NMn —that there is a 
stronger network externality—i.e., n —and that the level of compatibility in the 
case of the monopoly is larger than that in the case of noncooperative Cournot 
competition; i.e., .NM    
Next, with respect to the profit per a unit firm, we derive the following relationship: 
 
 
       .0)(211
)(1)(




NMN
NMNM
nnn
qq
 
Thus, if   ,  NMn  then it holds that .NM    In this case, consumer surplus 
increases compared with the case of noncooperative Cournot competition. This result 
implies that the monopoly is more socially preferable to noncooperative Cournot 
competition. 
The above relationship can be also expressed as: 
       ,0)(111)(  nNMNM         (12) 
where        01221    and .01  n  Even with 
  ,  NMn  based on equation (12), if ,11
1 
 

N
M  then it holds that 
.NM    Furthermore, if ,11
1 
 

N
M  equation (12) can be rewritten as: 
  ,)(,,)( nNMNM                           (13) 
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where        .0111,, 

MN
NM 
  Thus, if   ,,, nNM    it holds 
that .NM    
 
3.2. Decentralized decision-making structure 
The holding company decides to delegate the quantity decision-making power to its 
local unit firms (D). Thus, two independent firms provide products i and j for each other, 
given that the level of compatibility between the products is the same as that in the 
monopoly; i.e., .MD    
Because each firm noncooperatively decides the output level, based on the case of 
noncooperative Cournot competition in Section 2.2, we derive the following 
equilibrium output level: 
.
)(2 M
D nn
Aq                                    (14) 
In this case, the total profits are given by   .22 2DDD q   
Based on equations (6) and (14), comparing the output level and profit per a unit 
firm, we obtain the following relationships: 
,)()( NMND qq                                  (15) 
.)()()( NMNDND qq                      (16) 
Given the noncooperative output decisions in both cases, the output levels and profits 
depend on the levels of compatibility. 
 
3.3. The optimal decision–making structure and welfare 
We examine which internal decision-making structure (i.e., centralized or decentralized) 
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the holding company decides on in the first stage. Because the total profits in these 
cases are   2122 MMM q   and   ,22 2DDD q   we derive the 
following relationship:  
 ,,)()( MMD Mn                           (17) 
where       .0111,   MMM   4  
   In view of equation (17), if the degree of a network externality—i.e., n —is larger 
than  ,, MM   with the same degree of product substitutability and compatibility as in 
the case of the monopoly, then it is optimal for the holding company to choose 
decentralization of quantity decision-making. Otherwise, the holding company chooses 
centralization of quantity decision-making, so that a multiproduct monopoly provides 
the two products. 
We examine whether the decision by the holding company is socially preferable in 
terms of consumer and thus total surplus. Taking equation (1), consumer surplus is 
given by    ,1 2kk qCS  where .,, DMNk   
In view of equations (10) and (14), the following holds: 
.MD qq                                               (18) 
This is because, given the same level of compatibility in both cases, the noncooperative 
output level under delegation is always larger than the monopoly output level.5 Thus, it 
holds that .MD CSCS   
                                                 
4 It holds that     .)(,)(,, NMMNM M    
5 The FOC is expressed as: .0
0




 jji
j
q
i
M qq
q
p
q
i
i


 In this case, because the 
relationship between the products is substitutionary, we have equation (18). 
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Therefore, we have the following result. 
 
Proposition 1 
If the degree of a network externality is sufficiently large—i.e.,  MMn  , —then a 
decentralized decision-making structure is optimal for the holding company. 
Furthermore, decentralization is socially preferable because not only consumer surplus 
but also total profits increase. 
 
Conversely, if the degree of a network externality is small—i.e.,  MMn  ,
—the holding company chooses the centralized decision-making structure. In this case, 
an implicit collusion—i.e., a multiproduct monopoly—arises. This case is not preferable 
for consumers, because consumer surplus decreases. For example, from the viewpoint 
of antitrust authorities and competition policy, if centralization is evaluated on consumer 
surplus, the antitrust authorities may not allow the decision of the holding company. 
   Furthermore, if the level of compatibility between the products in the case of the 
monopoly, which is the same as that of a unit firm under decentralization, is larger than 
that in the case of noncooperative Cournot competition—i.e., NM   —it holds that 
ND CSCS   and .ND   That is, consumer surplus and total profits under 
decentralization are larger than in the case of noncooperative Cournot competition. 
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4. The Case of Consumer Ex Post Expectations 
 
So far, we have assumed that the expected network size is given for the centralized 
monopoly and decentralized local firms because consumers form their expectations 
about network size before the output decision. We call this the case of consumer ex ante 
expectations. In this section, we consider the case where consumers form their 
expectations for network size after the output decision—i.e., ex post expectations—and 
thus the firms can affect the network size.6 In this case, i
e
i qq   and ,jej qq   because 
consumers believe the firms’ output levels in forming their expectations of network size. 
Thus, equation (2) is revised as follows: ,jkii
e
i qqSS   ., MNk   Accordingly, 
in the case of consumers’ ex post expectations, the inverse demand function is given by: 
    .ˆˆ1ˆ jkii qnqnAp                               (19) 
   Hereafter, by following the same procedure as in the previous sections, we derive 
the equilibrium outputs and profits in the cases of noncooperative Cournot competition, 
a multiproduct monopoly by centralization (hereafter, monopoly), and decentralization. 
See Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 
   With respect to the outputs, we obtain the following relationships: 
  ,)(2ˆ)(ˆ   NMNM nqq                         (20) 
,)(ˆ)(ˆ NMND qq                                  (21) 
                                                 
6 In other words, we examine a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which consumers 
observe output levels before making actual consumption decisions. Because consumers 
have to make their choice given the choices of all other consumers in the Nash 
equilibrium, each consumer’s beliefs about the behavior of other consumers are 
confirmed. 
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.)(ˆ)(ˆ MMD nqq                                  (22) 
Thus, if it holds that   ,NMNM nnn    which is the condition in the 
case of consumer ex ante expectations, we derive the following relationship:  
.ˆˆˆ NDM qqq                                           (23) 
   Equation (23) implies that consumer surplus in the case of the monopoly is larger 
than in the others. 
   In view of the profits as in Table 1, we can directly derive the following 
relationship: .ˆˆ DM  7  Thus, the holding company chooses a centralized 
decision-making structure, so a centralized multiproduct monopoly arises in the case of 
consumers’ ex post expectations. 
Furthermore, as shown above, if ,NM nn    the centralized monopoly 
providing products with a sufficiently high level of network compatibility is preferable 
for consumers and the society. This result is different from that in the case of consumer 
ex ante expectations because in this case, the expected network size is exogenously 
given for output levels of both the centralized monopoly and the decentralized local 
firms. Thus, given the same level of network compatibility, as in equation (18), the 
equilibrium output level of the decentralized local firms is larger than that of the 
centralized monopoly. However, in the case of consumer ex post expectations, the 
expected network size is known for the centralized monopoly and the decentralized 
local firms, and they can decide their output levels according to the level of network 
                                                 
7 The profits in Table 1, we can derive the following relationships: 
     
      .))((0)(14
1)(
)(12
11
ˆ)(1)(ˆ1ˆ)(ˆˆ)(ˆ
2
2
22
M
MM
MMDMDMD
n
nnnn
n
qnnqn







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compatibilities. Thus, as in equation (22), the level of network compatibility under the 
centralized monopoly is larger with product substitutability, and the equilibrium output 
level of the centralized monopoly is larger than that of the decentralized local firms.8 In 
addition, the prices of the centralized monopoly are higher than those of the 
decentralized local firms. As a result, the profits of the centralized monopoly are larger 
than those of the decentralized local firms. 
   We summarize the analysis discussed above as follows. 
 
Proposition 2 
If consumers form expectations about network size after the firms make their output 
decisions—i.e., ex post expectations—it is optimal for the holding company to choose 
the centralized decision–making structure (i.e., multiproduct monopoly). However, if 
,NM nn    the multiproduct monopoly is socially preferable because consumer 
surplus, total profits, and thus social surplus are larger than those in the cases of 
decentralization and noncooperative Cournot competition. 
 
Proposition 2 implies that collusive agreements and mergers—i.e. a multiproduct 
                                                 
8 The FOC of total profit maximization of the monopoly in the case of consumers’ ex 
post expectations is given by: .ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆˆ
ˆ
ˆ
j
i
j
i
i
i
i
i
M q
q
p
q
q
pp
q 


  In this case, evaluating at 
the equilibrium of decentralization—i.e.,  0ˆ
ˆ
ˆˆ
ˆ
ˆ 


i
i
i
i
i
i q
q
pp
q
 —the FOC is expressed 
as:   .ˆˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
0
ˆ
ˆ
jMj
i
j
q
i
M qnq
q
p
q
i
i







 If ,)( Mn   the relationship of both 
products is substitutionary (complementary). The monopoly does not have (has) an 
incentive to provide more of the products. Thus, we have equation (22). 
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monopoly—are more efficient than noncooperative competition in terms of social 
welfare. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
We examined the optimal choice of internal decision-making structures and its welfare 
effect in a network industry. Focusing on the role of compatibility between products, we 
demonstrated that if the level of a network externality is sufficiently large, 
decentralization increases not only consumer surplus but also total profits compared 
with the cases of the centralized multiproduct monopoly and noncooperative Cournot 
competition. This result is socially preferable not only for consumers and antitrust 
authorities but also for the holding company (i.e., stockholders). 
   We should note that if consumers form their expectations of network size after a 
firm’s output decision, the centralization of decision-making structure is optimal for the 
holding company. Thus, the centralized multiproduct monopoly provides horizontally 
differentiated products with network compatibilities. However, if the level of network 
compatibility under the multiproduct monopoly is sufficiently large, consumer surplus is 
larger than that in the cases of noncooperative Cournot competition and 
decentralization. 
   We appreciate that because the model is based on various specific assumptions, we 
should not directly apply the results to antitrust and competition policies. In future 
research, we intend to discuss more general cases, relaxing the limiting assumptions and 
extending the model to oligopolistic competition. In this paper, we have dealt with 
 16
multiproduct monopoly case. However, in the case of oligopoly, we must consider the 
role of outside (multiproduct) firms when investigating the optimal choice of internal 
decision-making structures. 
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Table 1: The case of consumers’ ex post expectations 
 Output Profit  and  total profits 
Noncooperative Cournot 
competition (Benchmark)   )(12ˆ NN nn
Aq    
  2ˆ1ˆ NN qn  
NN ˆ2ˆ   
Centralization 
  )(12ˆ MM nn
Aq  
  2ˆ)(1ˆ MMM qnn  
MM ˆ2ˆ   
Decentralization 
  )(12ˆ MD nn
Aq    
  2ˆ1ˆ DD qn  
DD ˆ2ˆ   
 
 
